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The purpose of this study is to research the effect of Herodotus’ bias towards the 
Ionians had on his account of the events, figures, and proposed purpose of the Ionian 
Revolt.  Research has shown that Herodotus had a favorable perspective on other 
Greek groups. Unlike these groups, Herodotus’ perspective of the Ionians as the 
weakest of the Hellenic ethnic groups permeates his account of the Naxian Expedition, 
the revolts in Ionia and Cyprus, and the Battle at Lade, collectively known as the Ionian 
Revolt.  This thesis examines Herodotus’ Ionian Revolt, its purpose and function, as 
well as the effect how the author’s bias towards the group overshadow the historical 
significant and the profound political and military innovations of the revolt. 
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 Introduction  
The Greek Colonization of Ionia and Persian Intervention 
 
The Mycenaeans seem to have been the first Greeks to colonize the west coast 
of Asia Minor.  This massive migration took place during the sixteenth century BC1.  
During the eleventh century, in a second wave of migration a cohesive group of Greeks 
from Attica and Boeotia established colonies over a short period of time.2  In the tenth 
and ninth centuries, the migrants settled northwards along the coast of Asia Minor, and 
around the Gulfs of Ephesus and Miletus. They developed the poleis on the islands of 
Samos, Miletus, Myus, Priene, Ephesus, Colophon, Lebedus, and Teos. These early 
tribes seem to have been Hellenistic in character, meaning these tribes were 
independent from one another and different from each other in many ways, such as 
religion, language, and politics.3 The community usually consisted of an aristocracy of 
landowners and a lower class of free framers, with a few craftsmen.   
Politically, Ionia was more a construction of several tribal communities than an 
integrated political structure.  In the mid-seventh century, the Ionians formed a dominant 
political structure called the Ionian League. The members of the Ionian League 
maintained a level of autonomy.  Ephesus, for example, modified their original tribal 
structure into a territorial urban entity. 4 This political and commerce shift is in fact 
attested in the inclusion of Greeks metics and Anatolian natives into the polis; others, 
                                                          
1
 All date hence forth are in BC. 
2
 Carl Roebuck, “Tribal Organization in Ionia,” Transactions and Proceedings of the 
American Philology Association, Vol. 92 (1961), 495. 
3
 Jerome Murphy-O’Connor, St. Paul’s Ephesus: Text and Archaeology, Collegeville, 
Minn.:  Liturgical Press, 2008, 29. 
4
 Ibid., 13. 
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such as Miletus remained segregated.5  Once the Anatolian natives were allowed to 
participate, a cultural fusion began and Ionia became an international commerce center.  
They traded finished goods, such as pottery, and agricultural crops, such as cotton, 
olives, and wheat,6 via the Silk Road and overseas to Egypt, Phoenicia, and mainland 
Greece.7 The increase in economic growth of Ionia from the eighth to the sixth century, 
fostered by its poleis’ trade and colonizing, created a new economic group among those 
that participated in international commerce.  It produced a high level of prosperity 
among the entire population: Greeks, metics, and Anatolians.8 Increased prosperity is 
evident in the changes in pottery, art design, and architectural style. 
In the sixth century, Ionia was a strong commercial center.  As the wealth and 
population of Ionia increased, these neighbors engaged in petty wars, which forced 
them to develop their military prowess.  The creation of the military led to the 
reorganization of the established political systems. Those men that had the resources to 
support a militia and those that had slaves who could fight rose through the ranks of 
power.  These men often engaged in dubious practices to maintain that power. By the 
late sixth century and later, some Greeks tyrants could no longer independently 
maintain their rule. They turned therefore to their neighbor to the east, the Persians, for 
financial and military support.   
At this time, the Persians had a sizable army and their power extended to the 
coastline of Asia Minor (Hdt. 5.31), India, and Egypt. The Persian military force drew 
                                                          
5
 Roebuck, 495. 
6
 Alan Greaves, The Land of Ionia: Society and Economy in the Archaic Period, Malden, 
Mass.: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010, 71 and 75. 
7
 Greaves, 91 
8
 Roebuck, 506. 
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from the vast multi-ethnic cluster of nations over which the King had dominion.9  This 
heterogeneous state was marked by a high degree of organization and planning in the 
area of warfare.  The Greeks’ relationship with Persians was characterized by 
reciprocity.  The Persians had a strong personal interest in individual Greeks, who 
volunteered to be of services in justified expectation of gaining power and rewards. For 
example, Histiaeus, tyrant of Miletus, fully realized the opportunities presented to him by 
rendering good service to Darius (Hdt 4.137-9, 141). During the Scythian Expedition 
514 Histiaeus helped Darius and his army to escape from a Scythian trap.  In return for 
his service, Histiaeus requested and was awarded Myrkinos, a settlement in Thrace rich 
in timber and silver.  For some Greeks lending temporary aid to the Persian King, in 
expectation of his future favor was a calculated gamble to achieve their political 
ambition. 10  
When these ambitious Greeks failed to produce the results they promised to the 
King, dire consequences would ensue.  For instance, in 499, when Aristagoras failed to 
secure the Aegean Island of Naxos to Darius, he faced the wrath of the King. In order to 
forestall the consequences of his failure, Aristagoras raised a banner of democracy 
across Asia Minor.  The political activities of Aristagoras spread west across the Aegean 
Sea to Athens and Euboea in 499, east to Sardis in 498 B.C, and then south to Cyprus 
in 497.  Shortly after reaching these vast locations, the political conflict manifested itself 
into acts of insurgency against the Persian supported tyranny.  The Ionian Revolt was a 
complex series of military pursuits between the Persians and the Greeks that included 
                                                          
9
 Duncan Head, Achaemenid Persian Army (Stockport: Montvert Publication, 1992), 16.  
10
 M.M. Austin, “Greek Tyrants and the Persians, 546-479,” Classical Quarterly, Vol. 
 40, iss. 2, (1990), 301. 
  
4 
 
the large scale use of sea power and land forces, and siege apparatus.  It was the first 
international amphibious campaign between the Greeks and Persians.   
These series of campaigns were a collective part of the Ionian Revolt, which 
lasted from 499 to 493. It was supposedly a result of the Greeks’ attempt to free Ionia 
from Persian tyranny.  It must be noted that although the word tyranny would later be 
associated in the minds of the Greeks with Persian rule and Persian intervention; it was 
indigenous to Asia Minor.  Once the Persians extended their empire westward, the 
Persian practice, from Cyrus onwards, was to work with the established institutions of 
the people and countries that came under their domination.11  By the time of Persian 
intervention, many Ionia poleis had already come to be ruled by tyrants during the 
Archaic Age, independent from any intervention by foreign powers.12  
The primary source for the Ionian Revolt is Herodotus, a Carian born historian. 
His life spanned much of the fifth century, 484 to 414.  It is usually thought that 
Herodotus wrote much of his Histories from the 450s to the 420s.  He was exiled by the 
tyrant of Halicarnassus, Lygdamis, to the island of Samos.  Later, Herodotus is said to 
have taken an active role in delivering his native city from tyranny;13 this may have been 
the reason for his distaste for this type of government.  He spent much of his life in 
exile, in Samos, as well as Athens and Thurii.  Herodotus supposedly travelled to a 
multitude of regions, such as Egypt, Babylonia, and Athens.  By recording his travels 
and conducting his inquiry into the reason for the warring between the Greeks and non-
                                                          
11
 D.F. Graf, “Greek Tyrants and Achaemenid Politics,” in The Craft of the Ancient 
Historian: Essays in Honor of Chester G. Starr, John Eadie and Chester G. Starr.  
Latham: University Press of America, 1985, note 2.  
12
 Austin, 301. 
13
 B.M. Mitchell, “Herodotus and Samos,” The Journal of Hellenic Studies, Vol. 95 
(1975), 75. 
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Greeks, Herodotus exposes his readers to various cultures, stories of folklore, and 
scientific inquiry. 
  His purpose in writing was to prevent the great and marvelous deeds of Greeks 
and non-Greeks from being forgotten.  In his Histories, Herodotus intended not only to 
remember great deeds, but also to warn the Greeks about the perils of hubris. The 
theme of hubris is echoed throughout the work and is strongly emphasized during the 
Ionian Revolt.  Herodotus’ assessment of the Ionian Revolt gave him a unique 
opportunity to warn the Athenians against accepting the tyrannical government that they 
had fought so valiantly against.14   
Although his purpose is noble, Herodotus is biased against the Ionians and held 
sympathies towards others.  Herodotus’ belief that the Ionians were the weakest of 
Greek ethnic groups permeates his account of the Ionian Revolt.  Due to his viewpoint, 
any possible successes achieved by the Ionians are deemed as good fortune or are 
simply ignored by the historian.  This is markedly different from his view of the other 
Greek populations involved, such as the Samians.  The Samians assisted the Ionians, 
but retreated during the Battle at Lade Island, when they questioned the commitment of 
the rest of the Ionian contingent to the revolt. Herodotus treated the Samians’ departure 
as a reasonable response to the instability of the alliance rather than as a betrayal to 
                                                          
14
 After the Greco-Persian Wars, the Greek poleis formed the Delian League. The 
league consisted of 173 Greek city-states; the purpose of the league was to “avenge the 
wrongs they suffered by ravaging the territory of the King” (Thuc. 1.96). The league 
members were eager to dissolve their involvement, possible believing that the purpose 
of the league had been achieved; the Athenians then established themselves as 
leaders. The Athenians, unfortunately, did not heed Herodotus’ warning concerning 
becoming a new type of tyrant and in 454 Athens became an empire.  Twenty years 
later, the members of the Delian League declared war against Athens which prompted 
the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War.  
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the alliance.  Herodotus’ sympathy is likely due in part to the fact that he spent a 
considerable amount of time in this polis during his exile. There, however, can be no 
doubt that he obtained his information first hand during his exile from Samians who 
wished to be viewed favorably in history.  
 Herodotus’ bias and sympathies notwithstanding, he is the only historian of this 
event.  His investigative technique of examining archaeological evidence, such as the 
Royal Road, and recording oral accounts of military affairs was innovative, laying the 
foundation for inquiry into the causes and consequences of events.  Herodotus was a 
sophisticated narrator who treated what people said and believed as if they mattered. 
Herodotus embraced mythical discourse and the affect it had on the past generations of 
Greeks. He understood the importance of ethnography and anthropology as a means of 
explaining people’s lifestyles and their interaction with the other Greeks and non-
Greeks. The author was conscious of the effects of geography, culture, economics had 
influence the actions of individuals and the means by which individual actions affected 
communities.  He did nothing less than attempt to fashion for his Greek audience a 
portrait of themselves so that they would not repeat the mistakes of their past.   
Two arguments developed in this thesis will add insight to the Ionian Revolt.   
The first argument is that the Ionian Revolt had multiple successes in the area of 
political and physical warfare. Both Histiaeus and Aristagoras were innovative 
strategists who could adapt to any situation.  Although Herodotus deemed their actions 
as deceptive, these politicians were effective at exploiting the situation at hand.  The 
second argument is that the Ionian Revolt was arbitrarily written off as a failure, 
whereas it had remarkable success in several spheres of interest.  This accepted theory 
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that the Ionian Revolt was a failure is owed largely to the perspective of Herodotus.  The 
author’s own bias has distorted the importance of the revolt and there are several 
indications that his presentation of events was constructed to support his agenda, an 
agenda that introduced a failed attempt of the Ionians to free themselves from Persia in 
order show the Greeks as victorious underdogs of the Greco-Persian Wars.    
Another argument of interest is the purpose of the revolt in the Histories. The 
revolt, placed at the very center of Herodotus’ work,15 foreshadows in several respects 
the main object of the work---the Greco-Persian Wars.  The themes that motivate war 
and the construction of tyranny connect the Ionian Revolt to the Greco-Persian Wars. 
Herodotus thus may have skillfully suggested connections on several levels, 
encouraging readers to compare the situations at each of these bids for or against 
tyranny to understand the motivation behind them.  This narrative may provide a 
touchstone for comparing Persian tyranny with the Athenian sovereignty.  The Ionian 
Revolt served to remind Herodotus’ audience of the exact types of political problems 
besetting Greece toward the end of the fifth century and the origin of them.  
                                                          
15
 Rosario Munson, “The Trouble with the Ionians:  Herodotus and the Beginning of the 
Ionian Revolt (5.28-38.1),” in Reading Herodotus: A Study of the Logoi in Book 5 of 
Herodotus Histories.  (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 146. 
 Chapter One 
Herodotus’ Perspective of Ionian Weakness and  
The Ionians’ Reliance on the Strength of Persia 
 
The Ionian Revolt began with the Naxian Expedition of 499.  The expedition took 
place at Naxos Island, the largest Greek island of the Cyclades (map 1).  The 
inhabitants of the island formed a democratic party and ousted the 500 members of the 
aristocratic party.  The latter group sought refuge and assistance from Aristagoras, who 
in turn looked towards Persia for aid. The Naxian Expedition-an attempt by these three 
powers to retake Naxos-serves as an introduction to the type of relationship the Greeks 
had with the Persians and how that relationship created internal turmoil for both groups.     
In 500/499, Naxos gained the attention of the Milesians, the Persians, and the 
Athenians.  The ousted Naxians selected Miletus as a place of refuge.  Miletus is 
located on the western coast of Asia Minor.  In Miletus, the exiled Naxians believed they 
could initiate xenia, a sophisticated form of guest-friendship between strangers, with 
Histiaeus, tyrant of Miletus (Hdt. 5.30).  Under the guidelines of xenia, the displaced 
Naxians expected shelter, military support, and the necessary resources that would 
restore them to power at home.16   When the displaced Naxians arrived in Miletus, 
however, they discovered that Histiaeus was being retained in Susa, having left his 
nephew, Aristagoras, in power.17  
                                                          
16
 Gabriel Herman, Ritualised Friendship and the Greek City (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1987), 39. 
17
 Aristagoras had been the tyrant of Miletus for approximately fifteen years. The 
duration of Aristagoras’ governing Miletus can be deducted from the amount of time of 
Histiaeus’ various absences: from 514/513  he participated in the Persian campaign 
against Scythia, traveled to Myrkinos and established fortifications, and then was sent to 
Susa until the outbreak of the Ionian Revolt in 499 B.C (Hdt. 5.23-25, 30, and 124). 
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Aristagoras agreed to assist the exiled Naxians; he believed that in return for his 
services, the Naxians would offer him the position of tyrant of Naxos. In terms of military 
strength, Aristagoras knew that the Naxians had eight thousand armed men and many 
warships, more military power than he could muster alone.18  Therefore the only 
possible way for this venture to be successful was for everyone to cooperate with 
Persia.  Aristagoras believed that his friend, Artaphernes, the brother of King Darius, 
would assist them if he were asked (Hdt. 5.31).  
Hence, Aristagoras attempted, in effect to by-pass Histiaeus’ authority in order to 
create an opportunity to govern independently from his uncle. Aristagoras represented 
the displaced Naxians in a meeting with Artaphernes, satrap of Sardis.  Aristagoras 
promised Artaphernes’ various unspecified gifts and money in exchange for Persian 
support.  He then stated that Naxos was fertile in natural resources, rich in slaves (map 
2a and 2b) (Hdt. 5.30-1), and was also close in proximity to the Ionian coast (102 miles) 
and Euboea in Greece (130 miles).  Naxos would thereby make the effective launching 
site for Persia to attack Euboea (map 3) (Hdt. 5.31), which was the second largest of 
the Aegean Islands and diverse in rich metals such as gold, silver, and iron.19  This 
opportunity sat well with Artaphernes, as Darius was in favor of extending his empire 
into the crucial area of the Cyclades. This successful negotiation betrayed the displaced 
Naxians and endangered mainland Greece. Several islands of the Aegean Sea, Naxos, 
Paros, and Andros, were now designated to be absorbed into the Persian Empire (map 
                                                          
18
 Readers may note that it is interesting that, in Aristagoras’ initial conversation with the 
displaced Naxians, he informs them of the island’s military strength and not 
contrariwise. 
19
 Trudy Ring, Robert M. Salkin, and Sharon La Boda, “Euboea,” International 
Dictionary of Historic Places, Vol. 3: Southern Europe, (Chicago:  Fitzroy Dearborn 
Publishers, 1995), 231. 
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4). This venture would also enable the Persians to threaten Greece by land from the 
north and from the east by the sea.20 If the Persian policy of reciprocity still held true, 
Aristagoras was in prime position to be the next tyrant of Naxos. 
Darius provided Aristagoras with two hundred triremes, which, according to 
Wallinga, was a huge commitment since his total strength was three hundred.21  
Wallinga does not state where these triremes originated.  It can assume that the 
triremes were probably Phoenician from the seaports of Tyre or Sidon (map 5).22  
Darius sent a mobilized infantry force, with a tentative arrival time in Miletus in the 
Spring of 499  Once mobilized, the Phoenicians arrived somewhere in Persia to 
transport Megabates, the Persian commander, and his unit to Miletus, approximately 
1,000 miles away.  The Persians provided an estimated 42,600 men, including 170 
Greek rowers and additional personnel per trireme.23  
Once the Persian fleet arrived at Miletus, Aristagoras made a decision for the 
fleet to travel northward towards the Hellespont and secretly dock at the Bay of 
                                                          
20
 Oswyn Murray, “The Ionian Revolt” in John Boardman The Cambridge Ancient 
History Part IV:  Persia, Greece, and the Western Mediterranean, c. 525.-479, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 473. 
21
 H.T. Wallinga, Ships and Sea power before the Great Persian War: The Ancestry of 
the Ancient Trireme, (New York: Brill, 1993) 133. 
22
 Sidon and Tyre were maritime centers and the principle naval bases of the Persian 
Empire.  These harbors were easily defendable and provided seafarers with the option 
of beaching or anchoring their vessels. Nick Marriner, Christophe Morhange, and 
Nicolas Carayon, “ Ancient Tyre and its Harbor: 5000 Years of Human-Environment 
Interactions,”  Journal of Archaeological Science, Vol. 35, Iss. 5, May 2008, 1281-1310. 
Nick Marriner and Christophe Morhange, “Under the City Centre, the Ancient 
Harbours Tyre and Sidon: Heritages to Preserve,” Journal of Cultural Heritage, Vol., 
April-June 2005, 185. 
23
  Aristagoras was awarded 200 triremes; each trireme usually has 170 rowers for a 
total of 34,000 men. Customarily, there are special personnel aboard the trireme 
including fourteen spearmen, four archers, and twenty-five officers equaling forty-three 
per trireme or 8600 total.  This expedition was probably equipped with 42,600. 
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Kaukasa, Chios. The bay is an unknown site located somewhere on the southern part of 
the island.  At Chios, the fleet would then change directions and travel southwest toward 
Naxos (figure 1). Chios was twenty miles closer to Naxos from Miletus; launching an 
attack from Chios would decrease travel time by three hours, thus allowing the fleet to 
arrive at Naxos during the day rather than at night.  This position also allowed the fleet 
to attack Naxos directly from the north, rather than blindly approaching the island from 
the west24 and allowed the fleet to take advantage of the Etesians winds, which blow 
from the north Aegean Sea. These fierce winds allowed the oarsmen to preserve their 
strength; they also were able to increase the speed of the fleet. 
At this point, things were proceeding as planned. While docked at Chios, 
however, Megabates discovered that there were no guards posted aboard a Myndian 
trireme (Hdt. 5.33).  In response, Megabates instructed his personal guards to find 
Captain Scylax.  Upon Captain Scylax’s arrival, Megabates implemented a “field 
punishment.”25  He ordered his guards to tie-up Captain Scylax and pushed his head 
through an oar-hole of the ship (Hdt. 5.33).  Morrison and Coates describes the oar-hole 
as a “thalamian oar-port,” which is customarily found in Corinthian designed trieres.26  A 
Greek witnessed the event and informed Aristagoras that Megabates had mistreated 
Scylax. Aristagoras released Scylax and then told Megabates that he had overstepped 
his position: 
                                                          
24
 Andrew Robert Burn, Persia and the Greeks:  The Defense of the West, c. 546-478, 
(New York: Minerva Press, 1968), 196-7. 
25
 Burn, 197. 
26
 John Morrison and John Coates, The Athenian Trireme: The History and 
Reconstruction of an Ancient Greek Warship, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2000), 41.  
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What has any of this business got to do with you? Didn’t 
Artaphrenes send you to obey my commands and to sail wherever I 
tell you?  Why don’t you mind your own business? (Hdt. 5.33). 
 
Megabates ordered some of his men to warn the Naxians about the impending invasion.  
According to Herodotus, the Naxians were not aware of the impending attack until 
Megabates’ messengers informed them.   
The story of Megabates’ treachery illustrates the friction that existed between the 
Ionians and the Persians. 27 Keaveney believes that the Persians saw themselves as 
superior to all other ethnic groups. They had a socio-political structure where every man 
knew his place. Bearing this in mind, the Persians felt that the Greeks did not respect 
this hierarchy and thus the friction was created. He states that Megabates’ actions were 
a way to counter Aristagoras’ pompous attitude.   
Other scholars, however, believe that this entire story was created after the 
failure of the invasion.  Burn asserts that it seems incredible that an Achaemenid officer, 
whose own credit was involved in the success of this expedition, would do such a 
thing.28  Cary agrees; he rejects the allegation that Megabates, “a keen and competent 
commander, and Persian noble-man, should have turned traitor out of pure spite is 
incredible.”  Strassler writes that this claim of sabotage by Megabates is unsatisfactory 
because it does not fit in the allotted timeframe.  Megabates’ message was sent to 
Naxos from Chios, a distance of about eighty miles, a voyage of less than eight hours, 
giving the Naxians far too little time to prepare for a four- month siege.29  Strassler 
                                                          
27
 Arthur Keaveny, “The Attack on Naxos: A ‘Forgotten Cause’ of the Ionian Revolt,”  
The Classical Quarterly, New Series, Vol. 38, No.1 (1998), 78. 
28
 Burn, 196. 
29
 Robert Strassler, The Landmark Herodotus, (New York: Pantheon Books, 2007), 764. 
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points out that the main difficulty of Herodotus’ account is Megabates’ conduct; 
Megabates would have been severely punished for intentionally failing to reduce Naxos.  
This event seems to be a libelous rumor to explain the failure of the expedition.   
Megabates’ notification was not the only way the Naxians could have been 
warned about the impending attack.  It is possible that the Naxians heard about the 
attack from one of their own.  Naxos was a commercial community; they exported much 
of their natural resources, such as sheep, goats, various cheese, hides, and emery.  
Possibly, one of the Naxian traders or other seamen may have seen Aristagoras’ 
massive fleet at sea and informed his fellow countrymen of impending trouble in the 
Aegean.  Another possibility is that an exiled Naxian informed the Naxian on the island 
about the endeavor as a token of good faith in order to return to Naxos. If we agree with 
Herodotus’ account, then the Naxians must have been forewarned in enough time, 
possibly a couple of months, to stockpile their food supply and move the animals into 
the reinforced walls (Hdt. 5.34).   
The Naxians’ preparation for the siege was successful.  Aristagoras, who 
believed the venture would be swift, improperly prepared for anything other than a 
prompt conquest.   Aristagoras quickly ran low of money, food, and supplies.  Before 
retreating, Aristagoras constructed a fortification for the exiled Naxians, somewhere on 
the island, and departed for Miletus (Hdt. 5.35).   
The expedition for Naxos had failed.  Megabates’ supposed betrayal 
inadvertently dismantled Aristagoras’ acquisition of Naxos and voided Aristagoras’ 
  
14 
 
promise of the Aegean islands to King Darius. Moreover, it brought into question the 
fundamental basis of Miletus’ formally egalitarian friendship and alliance with Persia.30    
 The Naxian Expedition was Aristagoras’ attempt to use the political chaos of the 
Naxos to gain political control over the polis.  Aristagoras was able to garner military 
and financial support from Persia, as well as manpower from his Ionian supporters.  
Although, Aristagoras feared punishment from King Darius, he may have learned a 
thing or two about political strategy from his uncle Histiaeus.  Herodotus’ account of 
events appears to set the Ionian Revolt as a complete failure from beginning to end.   
                                                          
30
 Pericles Georges, “Persian Ionia Under Darius: The Revolt Reconsidered,” Historia: 
Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte, vol.49, no.1. (1st Qtr., 2000),  17. 
 Chapter Two: 
Herodotus’ Missed Opportunities and Impeding Correlations 
 Aristagoras failed to deliver Naxos to King Darius; furthermore, he had destroyed 
his relationship with Artaphernes.  Aristagoras believed that conflict with Megabates 
would not sit well with his investors.  Without any hope of becoming a Persian-
supported tyrant, Aristagoras looked for a new way to come to power in Ionia. Over the 
next couple of months, Aristagoras devise a plan to off-set his punishment from King 
Darius.  His plan included raising a rebellion across Asia Minor.  His goal was to induce 
Persian-supported Ionian tyrants to bear arms against the very people that put them into 
power.  During this same time, Onesilus, a Cypriote, took advantage of the chaos 
stirring in Ionia.  He, like Aristagoras, was thirsting for power and at the proper moment 
disposed of his brother and become King of Cyprus.   
 
The Revolt in Ionia 
Histiaeus concluded that, if trouble was stirring at home, Darius would send him 
to Ionia to settle the chaos.  Histiaeus devised a plan to communicate this idea to 
Aristagoras.  He tattooed the head of his most trusted slave, waited for the slave’s hair 
to grow back, and then sent the slave to Aristagoras. The slave probably travelled from 
Susa to Miletus by the Royal Road (figure 2) which connected Sardis to Susa, it ran 
1491 miles west of Susa or a three months’ journey on foot.31  The road system, and 
111 checkpoints it included, provided an infrastructure that linked Sardis to the vast 
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area of the Achaemenid Empire, to provide the King with a means to maintain constant 
communication with the distant regions of his territory.32 The slave, by taking the Royal 
Road from Susa to Miletus, travelled approximately 1568 miles or 98 days. 
Murray is suspicious of this account; he believes that Herodotus wove this tale 
into Histiaeus’ biographical account to please Herodotus’ audience, who were 
fascinated with the idea of cunning intelligence.33  Traver agrees with Murray. 
Herodotus appears to have used the literary technique of adding a folkloric nucleus into 
a biographical account.34  Cawkell points out that if the slave was reliable enough to 
carry the message on his head, he was reliable enough to remember it.35  The 
placement of the message hardly made the secret message secure: how was the 
message going to be concealed once the head was shaved? The slave would have to 
remain in Susa for four months waiting for the hair to grow back36 before leaving for 
Miletus.  For the slave, as well as Histiaeus, waiting approximately four months in 
Miletus or Sardis and traveling the Royal Road was a dangerous proposition for all 
parties involved.  If anyone suspected that Histiaeus had plans to commit treason 
against the King, all of Ionia would suffer for his betrayal.  
                                                          
32
 The Royal Road connected Sardis, located on the Ionian coast, to Susa, located west 
of the Persian Gulf and thence to Persepolis and even India; it intersected with other 
roads that led to Palestine, Egypt, Media, Bactria, and Sogdiana (Dusinberre, 14). 
33
  Oswyn Murray, “The Ionian Revolt”, in John Boardman, ed., The Cambridge Ancient 
History, vol. 4: Persia, Greece and the Western Mediterranean C. 525 to 479  
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 486. 
34
  Andrew Traver, From Polis to Empire:The Ancient World, c. 800  – A.D. 500: A 
Biographical Dictionary, (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2002), 201. 
35
 George Cawkwell,  The Greek Wars: The Failure of Persia,  (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2005), 69-70. 
36
 New Harvard Guide to Women's Health, The. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
2004. s.v. "Hair Care," http://www.credoreference.com/entry/hupwh/hair_care 
(accessed April 15, 2010). 
  
17 
 
Once the slave reached Miletus with the instruction to shave his head; 
Aristagoras read a single message:  revolt.37  Aristagoras was more of a revolutionary 
leader than Histiaeus expected.38  He publicly renounced his position; he converted 
Miletus to isonomia, a ‘theoretical state’ of equality before the law, so that citizens could 
voluntarily join the rebellion. 39  Kuhrt asserts that Aristagoras’ action was a calculated 
move to distance the rebels publicly from Persian rule.40  Gorman adds that isonomia 
was intended to allow Aristagoras to hold onto the reins of power despite the change in 
his “alleged” political stance.41  Next, Aristagoras rapidly organized the Ionian poleis to 
revolt politically against Persian rule. Tyrants across Ionian threw off the Persian yoke in 
support of Aristagoras.  In some cities, tyrants were replaced by elected strategoi, other 
tyrants were killed, and some were allowed to go free.  These strategoi now held the 
power formerly held by tyrants, and they like the previous governors, would take the 
necessary measures to remain in power. A similar change of power occurred after the 
Greco-Persian Wars and prior to the Peloponnesian War.   
The victorious Greeks of the Greco-Persian Wars decided to create a league to 
protect themselves from another Persian invasion.  The Delian League, to the Greek 
members was effective in warring off any impending attack, maybe too effective.  Some 
Greeks decided to dismantle the league; the Athenians however had something better 
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in mind.  The Athenians decided to take control of the league and build up the Greek 
presence at sea.  The agreement was that the other Greek poleis, in order to be 
protected, had to help finance the triremes and provide the manpower.  In doing so, 
Athens was able to create an empire and financially handcuffed their members into 
submission. It appeared that the every political oppression that the Greeks fought 
against twenty years earlier, had been created by one of their own—the Athenians. 
It should be noted that a multitude of research has been done concerning the 
economic distress the Greeks endured under Persian rule.  Dandamaev writes that 
before the sixth century, the prosperity of craftsmen, merchants, sailors, and traders 
depended on the market system.42  The Asia Minor region was an international 
marketplace where professional groups traded their various products for foreign goods, 
such as timber from Thrace and grain from the Black Sea littoral.43   After the sixth 
century, the Persians took control of the Black Sea and the Bosporus Straits area. As a 
consequence, the commercial community of Asia Minor became beset by the various 
mercantile problems.  These traders joined the Ionian rebels and played an active role 
in the revolt. It appeared that Aristagoras had gained the necessary vote of confidence 
and the necessary manpower to pull off this coup.  Only Hecataeus of Miletus, the 
historian and cartographer, opposed Aristagoras.  He is considered one of the wise 
advisors of Herodotus’ work. Hecataeus advised Aristagoras to cease all hostilities 
against the Persian King; but his advice was rejected. Hecataeus then suggested that 
the rebels should gain control over the sea.  In order to do this, the rebels would need to 
seize the treasures in the shrine of the Branchidae.  The booty from the shrine would 
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provide enough money to sustain their sea power and prevent Persia from doing the 
same.44 
Another wise advisor, similar to Hecataeus, was Artemisia, ally of Xerxes during 
the expedition against Greece. Of the entire navy at the Battle of Salamis, 480, the five 
ships she furnished were the most highly esteemed, after the Sidonians, and her 
counsel to the King was the best out of all the allies (Hdt. 7.99).  She counseled King 
Xerxes not to wage a battle at sea against the Greek, for his strength lay with his army.  
Artemisia suggested that Xerxes should maintain his ships near land and advance into 
the Peloponnese (Hdt. 8.68).  The Greeks, she predicted, would scatter and each polis 
would fall; but she cautioned that if he attempted to rush into another sea battle he 
would fail.  The consul of Hecataeus and Artemisia failed to protect their respective 
leader from demise.   
Hecataeus’ recommendation would later, during the Peloponnesian War, provide 
the roadmap for successful action.  Themistocles and Alcibiades, both Athenian 
statesmen and general of the Peloponnesian War, saw the “value of converting 
neglected financial resources into working capital for naval arms.”45 Themistocles urged 
and was successful in persuading Athens to understand that its future lay with the sea.46  
At his recommendation, Athens became a sea power and one hundred new triremes 
were built.  Within three years, the Athenians controlled two hundred triremes.47 
Alcibiades, during the second half of war also understood the power of being a naval 
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force and instructed Sparta to fortify a base of operation near Decelea in Attica.  The 
purpose of the base was to block Athens’ access to the silver mines, thereby prevent 
the Athenians from being able to construct new triremes.48  
Without considering Hecataeus’ comments, Aristagoras sent Iatragoras to seize 
the fleet and its commanders docked at Myous (Hdt. 5.36).  Through a ruse, not 
specified by Herodotus, Iatragoras successfully arrested commanders from Mylasa, 
Termera, Mytilene, Cyme, and many others (Hdt. 5.37).  Aristagoras was by no means 
ignorant of the challenge faced and sought assistance from Sparta and Athens (map 6).  
 Aristagoras arrived at Sparta, with some Thraco-Scythian chieftains,49 during the 
reign of Cleomenes.  He brought a bronze chart engraved with a map of the whole 
earth, showing every stretch of sea and all the rivers.  Aristagoras eagerly professed to 
Cleomenes that “these non-Greeks aren’t formidable fighters, for they fight with bows 
and shorts spears; as opposed to Spartans who have attained the highest achievement 
of all military prowess” (Hdt. 5.49).  He hinted that the inhabitants of that continent were 
richer in resources than the rest of the world and if Sparta was able to control the Asia’s 
wealth—silver, bronze, yoke-animals, and slaves—then the Spartans could easily be 
rulers of Asia (Hdt. 5.49).   
Aristagoras’ tentative plan of attack was for Thraco-Scythians to invade Media 
via the river Phasis, while the Spartans marched inland from Ephesus.  Cleomenes 
delayed his response for two days. On the second day, Cleomenes asked Aristagoras 
the length of the journey from the Ionian coast to King Darius.  Aristagoras replied three 
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months.  Kuhrt points out that Aristagoras cleverly misrepresented the Ionians’ 
commitment to the cause and had thoroughly persuaded the Spartan King, until this 
point and he should have continued lying.50  A three months campaign for the Spartans 
was impossible in 499, for four reasons: there was perennial danger of Helot revolt; 
previous Spartan maritime ventures had failed; lines of communication would be 
unsustainable, as Aristagoras inadvertently admitted (Hdt 5.50); and Agros was actively 
hostile and could not be trusted while a large portion of the Spartan army was 
overseas.51 In truth, Cleomenes believed that aiding Ionia was a poor investment.52 
Conscious of these reasons, Cleomenes dismissed Aristagoras, stating “guest-
friend from Miletus…you speak a word which sounds not well in the ears of the 
Lacedemonians” (Hdt. 5.50).   Aristagoras, unwilling to fail, went to Cleomenes’ house 
with a branch of supplication in order to gain entry.  Aristagoras pleaded his case, 
offering the king a bribe of fifty talents.  This act of persuasion was interrupted by 
Cleomenes’ daughter Gorgo.  She advised her father to dismiss himself rather than risk 
being corrupted (Hdt. 5.51).  Cleomenes followed his daughter’s advice and left the 
room. Despite his masterful speech and crude bribery, Aristagoras achieved nothing 
and left for Athens. Waters believes that Herodotus’ account of Aristagoras’ lengthy 
speech to Cleomenes was purposefully written in order to present not only Aristagoras 
as overplaying his hand, but also to inform readers that Sparta’s reluctance to send 
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forces far from home was the real reason for the failure of the Ionian Revolt, rather than 
a mere pretext.53   
Turning to Athens, Aristagoras presented himself before the Assembly, which in 
498 consisted of 30,000 men (Hdt. 5.97).  He repeated the same speech he delivered to 
Cleomenes, King of Sparta.  Aristagoras mentioned the riches of Asia and how easy it 
would be to defeat Persia. At this time, Athens had not begun to build her great navy, 
but the Athenians still managed to send twenty triremes out of a total seventy, to help 
the Ionians. 54 The Athenians assigned Admiral Melanthius as commander.  As a bonus, 
Eretria sent five ships to Miletus in return for the services rendered during the Lelantine 
War centuries earlier (Hdt. 5.99). De Souza states that the Athenians probably assisted 
the Ionians because of the existence of “a greater kinship with the Ionians… they 
shared dialect, religious festivals, and ancestry”.55 Other scholars believe that the 
reason for Athens’ support was not as noble. Ehrenberg believes that this opportunity 
also provided the Athenians with a means to gain access to the trade route from the 
Bosporus Straits to the Black Sea (map 7), which was in Persian control.56   
Dandamaev disagrees with Ehrenberg; he believes that although the Persians 
had gained control over the Black Sea, they did not impede trade.  The author maintains 
that the Persians did not desire to cause any hardship on the towns of Asia Minor of the 
Black Sea littoral.  In fact, the Persians delegated the patrolling of the Black Sea area to 
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the Phoenicians, who did not have a major economic interest in the region.  The 
Phoenicians had access to the same resources from lands adjacent to Phoenicia: 
Egypt, Lebanon, and Babylonia provided them with grain and timber, at a lower price, 
than those in the Hellespont.57  The hardship on the Asia Minor mercantile system was 
due to the Phoenicians becoming competitors with the lands of the Near East and other 
Greeks, such as Athenians.  Archaeological finds, such as Athenian pottery products, in 
northern Syria attest to such competition.  It is possible that the economic decline of 
Ionia was due to Athenian competition rather than any diminished access to the Black 
Sea.58  The Ionian Revolt was not going to correct the economic downfall of Ionia.  The 
addition of Athens, one of Ionia’s main competitors, may have made matters worse for 
the Ionians. If the Ionian Revolt was successful, it could open new territory, formerly 
controlled by the Ionians, to Athenian merchants.  
The revolt gained momentum through a deceptive appeal to the self-interest of 
larger cities, such as Athens and Euboea. With Athens and Euboea as allies, 
Aristagoras was able to convince others to mobilize.59  The mobilization of Athens and 
Euboea gave a false sense of security to the smaller poleis who thought that this 
venture would be worth the risk. Unlike these two poleis, the small Ionia city-states were 
not in a position to remove themselves from the rebellion once the situation 
degenerated.60 Aristagoras returned to Miletus and sent a message to the Paeonians. 
This tribe had been deported from the valley of the Strymon in Thrace to Phrygia in Asia 
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Minor by Megabyzus twenty years earlier (Hdt. 5.2).  Aristagoras proposed that if they 
joined the rebellion, they could regain their freedom and return to their homeland.  
According to Dandamaev, the insurgents were successful in returning the Paeonians to 
Thrace. 61  This act angered Darius, but Aristagoras needed all the allies he could 
muster.  
The Ionians army travelled to Ephesus and left their boats at Koresos. They then 
made their way inland, in considerable force and using Ephesians as guides. They were 
able to capture a part of the town of Sardis, was the capital of the former Lydian 
kingdom. It was known for its timber and various metals, such as iron, gold, silver, and 
copper.62  Both literary and archaeological evidences demonstrate active gold-mining 
during the Achaemenid period.63  The Susa Foundation Text implies that, during the 
reign of Darius, Sardis was not only rich in timber but also in carpenters, similar to the 
Egyptians.64  The city had enormous fortifications, with at least a primary outer wall and 
a secondary inner wall.65  To sack Sardis, one had to enter the city by scaling the 
crumbling wall almost vertically, at a point that seemed impregnable.66  It appears that 
only a spectacular feat of mountaineering could have breached the polis.67   
The Ionians were successful at reaching the outer wall.  Artaphrenes and his 
garrison, however, remained in possession of and prevented its looting of the treasury 
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within the inner wall of Sardis. Somehow, one of the Greek soldiers accidently set a fire 
to a house, which engulfed the city.68 The flames destroyed the temple of Cybele; the 
desecration of the temple provoked the Lydians to join the Persians. Some Persians 
and the Lydians were trapped in the city by the fire; they fled together to the agora and 
the Pactolus River.69 Surrounded by fire, the soldiers made a stand.  When the Ionians 
saw the determination of the Persians, the Ionians withdrew to Mount Tmolus and, 
under the cover of night boarded their ships for home.  
When word reached King Darius that the Ionians had burned Sardis, he ignored 
the Ionians, but inquired about the Athenians.  Then he shot an arrow into the sky 
asking Lord Zeus to make it possible for him to punish the Athenians.  Darius ordered 
his attendant to remind him three times a day to remember the Athenians (Hdt. 5.105).  
After issuing these instructions, Darius summoned Histiaeus of Miletus.  Darius 
confronted Histiaeus concerning his involvement with the Ionians and asserted that 
Ionians could not have succeeded without his help (Hdt. 5.106). Histiaeus replied that 
had he been in Ionia, this would have never happened.  This chaos provided Histiaeus 
with the opportunity to leave Susa; Histiaeus assured the king that he could restore 
order and deliver the instigator to him, if he returned home (Hdt. 5.106).  Darius 
believed him and allowed him to return to Miletus. Histiaeus promised that he would end 
the revolt and turn Aristagoras over to him. It was a ruse for he was simultaneously 
planning to make matters more difficult for the King.  
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Two years after lending support, the Athenians recalled their ships and the 
Eretrians followed suit (Hdt. 5.103).  Aristagoras appealed to Athens to remain 
steadfast, but the Athenians refused. Although, the Ionians no longer had Athens and 
Euboea as their allies, they continued their hostilities with the King.  The Ionian rebels 
subdued Byzantium and other cities, secured the greater part of Caria as their ally, and 
attracted the Kaunians, from Kaunos, a city in Caria.  The Kaunians joined after hearing 
that the Ionians had burned Sardis. Caria was incorporated into the Persian Empire as a 
satrapy in 545/4.  It’s most important city was Herodotus’ home, Halicarnassus.   
Herodotus regards the burning of Sardis only as an accidental act and not one 
that possibly renewed the spirits of other Ionians to revolt against Persia. Herodotus’ 
failure to emphasis the tremendous success of the Ionians in putting the Persians on 
the defensive in their stronghold is a prime example of his bias toward the Ionians.70  
Herodotus also failed to credit Aristagoras with an uncanny ability to create new 
alliances when necessary.  Herodotus was uncomfortable about giving praise to 
Aristagoras, who used the idea of democracy to avoid consequences from Persia, 
rather than participating in the genuine principles of freedom and Greek unity.71  
The Persian army, located west of the Halys River, received word of the chaos at 
Sardis and gathered their forces to help.  By the time the Persians reached Sardis, the 
Greeks had abandoned the city and were heading towards Ephesus.  The Persians 
followed their trail and defeated the Greeks in the summer of 498/7.72  The Persian 
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generals Daurises, Hymaees, and Otanes divided the Ionian cities among themselves. 
Daurises headed for the Hellespont, but was killed in an ambush, along with the Persian 
generals Amorges and Sisimakes (Hdt. 5.122).  Hymaees conquered Mysian Kios and 
then headed to the Hellespont. He subdued all the Aeolians inhabiting Illium, the 
Gergithians and the Teukrians. After Hymaees took these cities, he fell ill and died (Hdt. 
5.122).   
  
28 
 
The Cypriot Revolt 
Not long afterwards, the revolt spread to Cyprus, an island located south of 
Cilicia, north of Egypt, and west of Phoenicia (map 8a).   The island is the third largest 
island in the Mediterranean Sea. The population of Cyprus was divided into two ethnic 
groups, the Greeks and the Phoenicians. There was strife between the two groups, 
especially in the cities of Salamis, located on the east coast of Northern Cyprus, and 
Kition, located on the southern coast of the island (map 8b).  The Ionians gained 
support from the Salaminians by means of deceit.  Onesilus wanted to defect to the 
Ionian side, but his brother and the King of Cyprus, Gorgos opposed the idea. Onesilos 
waited until his brother left Salamis, locked his brother from the city, and took control of 
the city (Hdt. 5.104). Gorgos fled to the Persians. Onesilos, with his new-founded 
power, besieged the town of Amathous, situated on the southern coast of Cyprus, about 
twenty-four miles from Kition.   
Once in power, Onesilus sent heralds throughout Ionia calling for assistance. The 
Cypriots presented the Ionians with two options: they could either fight the Persians on 
land or the Phoenicians at sea. The Ionians maintained control of their ships (Hdt. 5. 
109). In 497, the Persians, commanded by Artybius, arrived with a large land force and 
met the Phoenician and Levantine fleets at the Keys of Cyprus, located on the north 
coast of the island (Hdt.5.108).  The Keys of Cyprus, modern day Cape Andreas, is 
located on the north coast of the island.73  The navies of the Persians and the 
                                                          
73
 Ibid., 134. 
  
29 
 
Salaminians engaged in battle (Hdt. 5.108).74 Herodotus gives no details about the 
actual event, except that it was a Persian defeat.   
On land, the Persian army was transported from the great naval base in Cilicia to 
Salamis, Cyprus.75  When the Persian army reached the plain of Salamis, the Samian 
kings drew up their troops and selected the best men to oppose the Persians. The 
Persian general Artybios rode a horse that was trained to rear on its hind legs when 
directly in front of a soldier.  When Onesilos learned this, he asked his shield bearer if 
he should attack Artybios or the horse. The shield bearer replied that a king and a 
general ought to confront each other (Hdt.5.112). As the two generals engaged in 
combat, Onesilos stuck the horse with a scythe, removing its forelegs and the Persian 
fell.  With Artybios down, the Cypriots appeared to have the upper hand; however things 
changed when the Kourian contingent and the Salamians deserted the cause.  The 
Cypriots no longer hand the manpower needed to defeat the Persia’s massive army. 
The Persians defeated the Cypriots, decapitated Onesilos, and hung his head over the 
city gates (Hdt. 5.114).  The Persians gained control over all the Cypriot poleis expect 
Salamis, which was handed to Gorgos.  The Ionians retreated to Ionia.  
As the Persians pursued the Ionians, Aristagoras proved himself to be coward 
(Hdt. 5.124).  Worried about the impending consequences of his action, Aristagoras 
convened a meeting of his supporters.  He asked whether Sardinia or Myrcinus was the 
best place for him to establish a colony (Hdt. 5.124).  Hecataeus, the wise advisor, 
recommended that Aristagoras should establish a naval base on the island of Leros 
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(map 9). It was a Milesian-controlled island located thirty miles south-west of Miletus.  
During the Peloponnesian War, the island was used as a point of reconnaissance by 
both Sparta and Athens (Thuc. 8.26).  Hecataeus’ advice was based on Aristagoras’ 
ability to use sea power to defeat the Persians, which would be the decisive factor in the 
Greco-Persian Wars, as well as later in the Peloponnesian War.   Gorman asserts that, 
at this time, Aristagoras was fleeing from the factional strife of his own people,76 who 
realized that Aristagoras could not produce his promise of permanently removing 
Persia’s influence.  Hecataeus’ advice was ignored for a third time and Aristagoras 
sailed for Myrkinos.  Somewhere in Myrkinos, Aristagoras and his supporters were killed 
in a raid.  
Once Histiaeus arrived in Sardis in 496,77 Artaphrenes asked him what started 
the revolt. Histiaeus appeared completely ignorant, but Artaphrenes said, “I’ll tell you 
what actually happened in this business, Histiaeus: it was you who stitched the shoe, 
while Aristagoras merely put it on” (Hdt. 6.1).  This accusation made Histiaeus anxious; 
he therefore fled Sardis for Chios. The Chians were suspicious that Histiaeus was 
working for King Darius and imprisoned him.  During his detainment, the Chians asked 
him why he had encouraged Aristagoras to revolt from the King.  Histiaeus explained 
that King Darius had plans to relocate the Phoenicians to Ionia and to move the Ionians 
to Phoenicia (Hdt. 6.3).  Herodotus notes that this was completely fabricated story and 
that Darius was planning no such thing (Hdt. 6.3).  Georges states that only a dreadful 
prospect, such as deportation was used to motivate the Ionians to break their tie with 
                                                          
76
 Gorman, 141. 
77
 Dandamaev, 163.  
  
31 
 
Persia.78  This prospect was an actual threat to the Ionians; the Persians deported 
Paeonians to Asia Minor in 518   The Chians, being fully deceived, set Histiaeus free.   
 Later, Histiaeus deployed a certain Hermippus to transport a letter to his Persian 
allies in Sardis (Hdt. 6.4).  Before delivering the message to the appropriate party, 
Hermippus first showed it to Artaphrenes.  When Artaphrenes discovered Histiaeus’ 
plot, Artaphrenes told the messenger to continue with the plan, but inform him first of 
the Persians’ reply.  Through this deceit, Artaphernes was able to discover and put to 
death the Persians involved in the coup but Histiaeus was able to escape to Miletus 
(Hdt. 6.4). In Miletus, he attempted to force the Milesians into submission; but he was 
wounded in the thigh by one of the citizens and driven from the polis. Histiaeus made 
his way to Chios, yet failed to receive any assistance.  Next, Histiaeus sailed to Lesbos 
and persuaded the Lesbians to give him eight triremes; from there he made his way to 
Byzantium (map 10).  In Byzantium, Histiaeus created a base of operations and 
blockade any ships in the Black Sea. 79 Histiaeus lived in Byzantium until he received 
news of the Battle of Lade.80  
The Ionian and Cypriot Revolt demonstrate the internal struggle for power among 
the Greeks. It also shows how the Greeks used the Persians to gain power and then 
when it suited them, betrayed the relationship.  In both revolt, readers will notice that the 
Ionian leaders had remarkable success in the first stage of their planning, such as 
gaining support from mainland Greece. Yet, the Ionians failed to remain loyal to each 
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other and to see their strategy to its conclusion, such as the attack on Sardis, which the 
Athenians and Euboeans left once it appeared the Ionians were losing. 
 Chapter Three: 
Herodotus’ Account of the Battle of Lade and the Rise of Sea Power 
For the Persians, the revolt had gone on for five years and conquering cities one 
by one was ineffective.   Aristagoras was dead and Histiaeus was on the run. The 
Persian took full advantage of lack of leadership among the Ionians and prepared for an 
attack. The Persians set their sights on Miletus, the home of the revolt, and mobilized 
their army and navy.  This final battle of the Ionian Revolt was the decisive act that 
changed the political landscape of Asia Minor.  
In 494, the Persians were preparing to launch an amphibious attack against 
Miletus; they decided to mobilize at Lade Island.81  Lade Island is a dissected ridge of 
rock located north of Miletus (map 11).  It is about two miles long and half a mile wide; 
the island is fairly defensible to the east, west, and south due to its landscape of various 
elevations, plateaus, mountains ranges, rivers, and rocky terrain.82  The harbor of Lade 
Island lies directly west of Miletus.83 The Persians’ plan was to force their way into the 
Latmic gulf, cross the Ionian front, and defeat them at sea.84 Once the Ionian fleet was 
destroyed, the Persian army could then invade Miletus by entering Akbuk Bay.  In 
Miletus, the Persian forces would unite to besiege the city.85  
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When the Ionians learned of the Persians’ assault against Miletus, they sent 
delegates to Panionium, in Mykale (Hdt. 1.148).  The Panionium was the religious 
centre of the old Ionian League; the powers and responsibilities of the Panionium are 
ambiguous and were probably never defined.86  The common decision-making body 
consisted of representatives (probouloi) from the following poleis: Miletus, Priene, Myus, 
Teos, Chios, Erythrae, Phocaea, Lesbos, and Samos (map 12).87 These nine cities 
decided to send contingents to the battle of Lade. The probouloi decided to assemble 
every available ship (Hdt. 6.7), including those triremes acquired after the failed Naxos 
Expedition of 500/499 at Lade Island (Hdt. 5.36). The defense strategy of Miletus 
required each polis to appoint its own navy commander and raise its own army.  The 
lack of organization and the inability to appoint a supreme commander was a basic 
weakness of the Ionian alliance.88    
The Ionian fleet was comprised of the Milesians with eighty triremes; the 
Prieneans with twelve triremes; the contingent from Myous with three triremes; the men 
of Teos with seventeen triremes; the Chians with a hundred triremes; and the 
Erythraeans and Phocaeans, with their squadrons of eight and three triremes, 
respectively. Next to these were the Lesbians with seventy triremes and the Samians 
held the western wing with sixty triremes. The Ionian navy force numbered about 353 
triremes (Hdt. 6.8) and possibly, 75,189 men.89  
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The Persians appointed a single naval commander, Datis, the Mede; however, 
they did not possess an overwhelming superiority at sea and initiated political warfare 
rather than an outright offensive strategy.90  To combat their lack of numbers and 
knowledge of the sea, the Persians ordered the former tyrants of the Ionian cities to 
address their fellow countrymen about the repercussions of their actions.  One tyrant, 
who had joined the Persians against Miletus, said to his peers that now is the time for 
each of them to show himself loyal to the King…if they complied, they would  not be 
punished; but if they continued to rebel against the King they would face dire 
consequences (Hdt. 6.9).91  After this notice was given, the Persians waited until 
intrigue brought out the Ionian defectors.92  This meeting yielded no immediate results; 
each man decided to stay the course and remain in the alliance.   
The Ionian alliance was addressed by Dionysius of Phocaea. If war was the 
course that the Ionians selected, he asked them to put themselves into his hands and 
assured them a victory (Hdt. 6.11). He stated that the road ahead would be faced with 
hard work, but in the long run they will be free.  Dionysius was able to secure support 
from some of the Ionian contingent, but not all; it appears that some poleis still 
maintained some type of command over their own fleets.93  The Phocaeans were skilled 
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and disciplined seamen, comparable to the Phoenicians.94  Dionysius wasted no time in 
preparing his men for battle.95 Every day, he scheduled military exercise for the fleet, 
which included practicing “breaking-line” or diekplous.96  The maneuver is an offensive 
tactic that allows a trireme or a squadron of triremes to sail through an opening in the 
enemy’s line of ships (figure 3).  Once the ships were behind the enemy’s line, they 
would turn and ram their opponent on the beam or stern.  After practice, Dionysius 
insisted that the fleet lie at anchor instead of coming ashore. In case of a surprise 
attack; he secured the base of the Ionian fleet at the entrance of the Latmic Gulf.  In this 
position, the Ionians would be concealed until the Persians rounded Lade Island and 
were in the Latmic Gulf.   
Under the command of Dionysius, these men did not get any rest and grew 
rebellious.  These men began to ignore Dionysius’ orders and pitched their tents to rest. 
When the commanders from Samos witnessed this spectacle, they concluded that the 
Ionians lacked the discipline required to succeed against the Persians (Hdt. 6.13).  
Under the cover of night, the dismayed Samians requested a meeting with the Persians.  
The idea of dissension among the Ionians as a reason for the Samians’ desertion is 
unsubstantiated.  Economics may have had more to do with the Samian treachery than 
rebellious sailors.  The Samians may felt that Persian tyranny offered a more lucrative 
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opportunity than Ionian freedom and thus they decided to disembark.97  Under the cover 
of night, the dismayed Samians requested a meeting with the Persians.  The Samians 
and the Persians came to an agreement that at the proper moment, the Samians would 
disengage and sail for home.   
The day of battle, the Persian advanced south from Halicarnassus and Cos and 
moved north toward Lade (figure 4).  The Persians at this point were unprotected; the 
only shelter available was near Leros Island, where Alinda Bay opened east, about 
twenty-five miles southeast of Lade (map 13).  Once the Persians were in sight, the 
Ionians scrambled to get into formation and sailed in line ahead to meet them (figure 5).  
At Lade Island, the Ionian squadrons were arranged from west to east, between Lade 
Island and Miletus.  The east wing and right of the line consisted of the Milesians and 
Prienans.  Across the Latmic Gulf lay Myus.  In the center were contingents from Teos, 
Chios, Erthrae and Phocaea; on the north-west wing were Lesbos and Samos (figure 
6). The triremes were positioned to correspond to the geographic location of the poleis 
represented.  This enabled each polis to provide a seamless method for communicating 
and supplying its triremes.   
Once the battle began, Dionysius activated his plan.  The whole fleet moved off 
in line abeam, in parallel course to the Persians’ columns as they entered the Latmic 
Gulf.  The Chians, with a hundred triremes, accomplished the diekplous.  Each principal 
squadron, along with its convoys, was wheeled into line ahead to strike the Persians’ 
flank and broke through the Persians’ line. The plan was for the Milesians to do the 
same maneuver; with the Chians and the Milesians acting together, they could possible 
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cut off the Persian navy.  At the pivotal point, however, forty-nine of the sixty Samian 
captains abandoned their position and sailed for home.  The Lesbians, who were next in 
line, were exposed to the northwest and retreated.  As a consequence of two of the 
Greek units “missing in action,” the rest of the Ionian contingent followed suit.  The 
Persians were victorious at the Battle of Lade. They then proceed to fulfill their promise 
of punishing the Ionians for their crimes against the King.  The male inhabitants were 
killed; the women and children were reduced to slavery. The surviving Milesians were 
taken to Susa and then relocated to the Red Sea in the town of Ampe on the Persian 
Gulf (map 14).  The Persians kept the Milesian territory for themselves (Hdt. 6.19).  
Miletus was captured in the summer of 494; the Ionians were reduced to slavery in the 
sixth year after Aristagoras’ first revolted.   
Only the Chians, who according to Herodotus were valiant fighters, remained 
(Hdt. 6.14).  They had provided the Ionians with 100 triremes, 17,000 oarsmen, and 
4,000 epibatai (deck soldiers).98 The crippled Chian triremes were forced to beach at 
Mycale and made their way to Ephesus, as they tried to make their way home on land. 
Their journey brought them to the Ephesian territory during the festival of 
Thesmophoria.  The festival of Thesmophoria was in observance of Dermeter’s 
mourning of her daughter, Persphone, who dwells in the underworld. By imposing 
celibacy for three days, Thesmophoria liberated a wife from having sexual relations with 
her husband.99  Men were strictly excluded; so when the Ephesians saw the armed 
Chians, they were absolutely sure that these men were coming to carry off their women.  
The Ephesians came out in full strength and killed the Chians (Hdt. 6.16).   
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In Byzantium, Histiaeus and his Mytileneans preyed on Ionian merchant ships 
from the Pontus and recruited the crews willing to follow him.   He sailed to Chios; but 
the Chians refused to let him pass.  According to Kuhrt, the Chians put him in fetters, 
because they suspected him of planning mischief against them on Darius’ behalf.100  
When the Chians learned that Histiaeus was revolting against the King, they released 
him.  Histiaeus left Chios for Lesbos after he received the message of the Persian 
victory and crossed over to the mainland.  With the assistance of the Lesbians, 
Histiaeus gained control of the island as a tyrant and launched a campaign against 
Thaos with a large Ionian and Aeolian force (Hdt. 6.26-27). While besieging the polis, 
Histiaeus learned that the Phoenician fleet had left Miletus to subdue the other Ionian 
polis. He therefore left his designs on Thasos unfinished in order to defend Lesbos.101  
 Histiaeus attempted to defend Lesbos from the Phoenicians.  In order to feed his 
army, he led a foraging raid near Atarneus and Myus.  There he was intercepted by 
some Persian forces led by Harpagus, thus commencing the Battle at Malene.  The 
battle took place near the town of Malene in northern Asia Minor.  There were heavy 
losses on both sides; however, the Persian cavalry got the best of the Ionian contingent.  
Histiaeus was captured by the Persians and when soldiers were about to kill him, he 
cowardly cried out in Persian that he was Histiaeus (Hdt. 6.29).  The Persians 
subsequently brought him to Sardis where he was met by Harpagus (Hdt. 6.29).  
Harpagus gave him to Artaphrenes, who considered him the author of the Ionian Revolt; 
Artaphrenes had him impaled and embalmed his head.  The embalmed head was sent 
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to Darius.  The King was upset by Histiaeus’ death and the King castigated the Persians 
who were involved in the murder of Histiaeus (Hdt. 6.30), because he saw Histiaeus as 
a friend and ally to Persia.  
The Battle at Lade was the first battle in which triremes were used. Although, the 
Ionians were defeated, the significant of this battle lies in the fact that the Ionians were 
able to provide 353 triremes and the men necessary to man it.  Another point of interest 
is that the Greeks took advantage of their knowledge of sea power and the fact that sea 
power was a weakness of the Persians.  Knowledge of the sea would be indispensible 
later during the Greco-Persian Wars, when the Greeks defeat the Persians at sea; thus 
enable them from being absorbed into the Persian Empire. 
 Conclusion 
The Consequence of Herodotus’ Bias towards the Ionians and His 
Depiction of the Ionian Revolt  
 
The Ionian Revolt began when a group of exiled Naxian aristocrats arrived in 
Miletus seeking assistance to return to power in Naxos. The expedition failed, but 
ignited an international scale rebellion throughout the Persian supported Ionian poleis.  
In the course of surveying the Ionian Revolt, it becomes evident that Herodotus’ bias 
towards the Ionians brings into question his account of the Ionian Revolt. There are 
several elements about the revolt that needs more investigation, such as the effect of 
Herodotus’ bias towards the Ionians on his recounting of the Revolt, his lack of 
correlation of the revolt to the Greco-Persian Wars.  
Herodotus’ prejudice against the Ionians is evident in Book One, “the Ionians 
constituted by far the weakest and most insignificant part of [Greece]” (Hdt. 1.143).  
Herodotus represents the Ionian communities as ineffective in achieving their goal of 
removing the Persian yoke of tyranny from Ionia.  Yet Herodotus’ own account shows 
that Aristagoras, as well as other Ionian leaders, achieved notable successes, such as 
putting the Persians on the defensive in their own stronghold in Sardis. Herodotus also 
failed to give Aristagoras credit for building new alliances when needed: he attracted the 
Persians Artaphrenes and King Darius to the Naxian Expedition; he persuaded Athens 
and Euboea to join a rebellion hundreds of miles away, despite their lack of sea power 
at the time; and he successful called for the dismantling of the Persian yoke and remove 
several tyrants across Ionia.   
Herodotus’ bias may have stemmed from his relationship with Lygdamis, tyrant of 
Halicarnassus, who exiled Herodotus. Having personally experienced of tyranny and 
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having been active in deposing it, Herodotus may have felt that Aristagoras’ use of 
insonomia to gain power was distasteful.  His bias, however, prevented him from 
correlating the events of the revolt with those that would later occur during the Greco-
Persian Wars. It also prevents readers from being able to correlate events, see 
similarities in peoples’ actions, and understand the change in warfare.  
The Ionian Revolt is an example of the importance of sea power for the Greeks. 
In the revolt, sea power was an underlying theme: the Naxian Expedition supposedly 
failed due to an unmanned post on the ship of Captain Scylax; the Cypriot Rebellion 
enjoyed a temporary victory after the navy defeated the Persians; and finally the Battle 
of Lade was a Persian victory because the Persians understood that they lacked the 
sea power necessary to defeat the Greeks.  Having realized this, the Persians initiated 
an alliance with the Ionians that were not completely committed to the cause.  This 
action was detrimental to the Ionians’ performance at sea, and the Ionians were 
defeated. Later in the Greco-Persian Wars, sea power was the main factor in the 
Greeks securing victory over the Persians; it would also assist the Athenians in creating 
hegemony over the Greek poleis and commence the Peloponnesian War.   
This thesis’ identification of Herodotus’ anti-Ionian bias implies that future 
research will need to concentrate on the international turmoil faced by the participants of 
the revolt and the individual rebellions throughout the Persian Greek satrapies. The 
Ionian Revolt affected Persia, mainland Greece, the Cycladic islands, the Black Sea 
littoral, and the towns of the Mediterranean Sea, such as those in Phoenicia and Cilicia.  
Aristagoras’ call for democracy affected economic, political, and military strength of 
Ionia and Persia. These three points demonstrate the need for more research on the 
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implication of author’s bias on the accounts he recorded and the influence of that bias 
on the research of historians.  Herodotus’ bias may have caused other historians to 
disregard the possible lessons that may be gained by understanding the motives and 
actions of the people involved, whether those actions are noble or disgraceful.  It also 
overshadows the lessons learned from the less than noble deeds, for instance the use 
of betrayal, propaganda, and deceit in warfare; as well as demonstrating how 
individuals such as, Aristagoras and Histiaeus, were able independently to gather 
support from other Greeks and non-Greeks in order to gain power.  The Ionian Revolt 
was a complex series of rebellions that unknowingly shaped the way that future nations, 
such as England, viewed and use sea power as a military strength and the importance 
of remembering the past in order not to repeat it.  
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Map 1: Islands of Cyclades Archipelago 
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 “The City of Naxos.”  37o06’24.56”N and 25o22’32.07”E. Google Earth.  2010. May 
31, 2010. The map is courtesy of Google Earth; alterations made by author.  
The City of 
Naxos 
Map 2a: The City of Naxos, Naxos Island 
  
47 
 
104
                                                          
104
  “Palatia Islet.” 37o06’22.72”N and 25o22’32.96”E. Google Earth.  2010. May 31, 
2010. The map is courtesy of Google Earth; alterations made by author.  
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Map 3: Euboea, Miletus, and Naxos 
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Map 6: Athens, Sparta, Euboea, and Miletus 
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1, 2010. The map is courtesy of Google Earth; alterations made by author. 
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 “Bosporus Straits and the Black Sea.”  41o03’06.60”N and 29o36’02.59”E. Google 
Earth.  2010. June 1, 2010. The map is courtesy of Google Earth; alterations made by 
author. 
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Map 8a: Cyprus  
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 “Cyprus.” 33o43’44.62”N and 31o53’08.41”E. Google Earth.  2010. June 1, 2010. The 
map is courtesy of Google Earth; alterations made by author. 
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Map 8b: Cities of Cyprus  
Legend 
Kition  
Amathous 
Keys of Cyprus  
Salamis  
 
                                                          
111
 “Cities of Cyprus.” 34o51’02.60”N and 33o26’59.49”E. Google Earth.  2010. June 3, 
2010. The map is courtesy of Google Earth; alterations made by author. 
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Map 9: The Island of Leros  
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 “Leros.” 37o14’03.73”N and 27o20’19.98”E. Google Earth.  2010. June 3, 2010. The 
map is courtesy of Google Earth; alterations made by author. 
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Map 10:  Byzantium 
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 “Byzantium.” 38o58’10.73”N and 26o39’27.96”E. Google Earth.  2010. June 3, 2010. 
The map is courtesy of Google Earth; alterations made by author. 
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Map 11: Lade Island 
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Map 12: The Ionian Poleis  
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  “The Ionian Poleis.”  38o20’30.62”N and 26o42’33.06”E. Google Earth.  2010. July 1, 
2010. The map is courtesy of Google Earth; alterations made by author.  
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Map 13: Alinda Bay, Leros 
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Map 14: Relocation of the Milesians 
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 “Town of Ampe.”  25o24’57.17”N and 48o04’56.20”E. Google Earth.  2010. July 1, 
2010. The map is courtesy of Google Earth; alterations made by author 
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 “Aegean Sea.” 37o51’32.18”N and 26o35’47.67”E. Google Earth.  2010. May 31, 
2010. The map is courtesy of Google Earth; alterations made by author. 
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Figure 2: Royal Road 
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Figure 3: The Diekplous 
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Figure 4: Day of Battle at Lade Island: Persian Advancement I 
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Figure 5: Leros Island: Persian Advance II 
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Figure 6: The Ionian Fleet Position 
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